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Abstract
Emergence of the utility of 3D point cloud data in criti-
cal vision tasks (e.g., ADAS) urges researchers to pay more
attention to the robustness of 3D representations and deep
networks. To this end, we develop an attack and defense
scheme, dedicated to 3D point cloud data, for prevent-
ing 3D point clouds from manipulated as well as pursuing
noise-tolerable 3D representation. A set of novel 3D point
cloud attack operations are proposed via pointwise gradi-
ent perturbation and adversarial point attachment / detach-
ment. We then develop a flexible perturbation-measurement
scheme for 3D point cloud data to detect potential attack
data or noisy sensing data. Extensive experimental results
on common point cloud benchmarks demonstrate the valid-
ity of the proposed 3D attack and defense framework. 1
1. Introduction
The popularity of 3D sensors, e.g., LiDAR and RGB-
D cameras, raises a number of research concerns with 3D
vision. Increasing accessible data makes data-driven deep
learning approaches practical to be used in many fields,
such as autopilot [37, 22], robotics [13, 5] and graph-
ics [35, 15, 31]. Particularly, point cloud is one of the
most natural data structures to represent the 3D geome-
try. Typical CNN-based approaches [26, 24] not only re-
quire pre-rendering the sparse point clouds into unnecessar-
ily voluminous representations, but also introduce quanti-
zation artifacts [23]. PointNet [23] and DeepSet [36] pi-
oneer the direction of learning representations on the raw
point clouds. By learning representation from permutation-
invariant and size-varying point sets, this idea is shown to
∗Equal contribution.
†Corresponding author.
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Figure 1. Framework of the proposed adversarial attack and
defense on point clouds. A well-tuned PointNet [23] is vulner-
able to our adversarial attacks. Fortunately, the proposed defense
strategies detect most (> 75%) of these adversarial samples, with
help of the attacked PointNet. Best viewed in color.
be effective and efficient, and has achieved remarkable suc-
cess [25, 17, 32].
Considering the popularity and potential use in numer-
ous crucial applications of point clouds, e.g. self-driving, it
is urgent to address the safety issues. It is proven that even
high-performance deep image classifiers are vulnerable to
the adversarial attacks [28, 29, 2], where visually similar
samples are generated to mislead the networks to classify
incorrectly. We are interested in the safety and robustness
of the deep nets given adversarial point cloud samples, es-
pecially when learning is based on the raw point clouds.
It is expected that point cloud classification networks are
fragile to pointwise gradient guided optimization adversar-
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ial attacks (e.g., FGSM-like methods [8]), due to the gen-
erality of these attack methods. We are showing that these
pointwise adversarial noises generate visually similar sam-
ples in 3D space. Besides, considering the realworld 3D
sensors, the common issues are sensing noises and vanish-
ing points. To this regard, we generate extreme sensing
noises by adversarial point-attach method, and remove pos-
sibly vanishing essential points by adversarial point-detach
method. As will be shown later, these prudent attached or
detached points are likely to change the decision of well
tuned networks. Theoretically, these points are highly re-
lated to the critical points [23] existing in the models.
On the other hand, we pursue defense strategies to pre-
vent the proposed adversarial attacks. Based on the ob-
servation that the adversarial point clouds destabilize the
model output, we explore the intrinsic robustness of the
attacked models. A perturbation-measurement defense
framework is developed to detect the adversarial samples,
which in principle defines a family of easy-to-implement
methods. The proposed perturbations are related to input
transformation [10] and stochastic activation [6] method-
ology, however either the shattered or stochastic gradients
”give a false sense of security” [2]. To this end, instead of
utilizing the perturbed samples as defense directly, we mea-
sure the statistics of the perturbed outputs of the attacked
models to detect the adversarial samples. By changing the
threat model with low costs, we detect most of the adversar-
ial samples generated by our attack methods.
The main contributions of this paper are threefold: we
1) address the safety issues of adversarial attacks on point
clouds, with three attack methods; 2) propose a flexible
perturbation-measurement defense framework to detect the
adversarial point cloud samples, with help of the attacked
models; and 3) analyze the transferability of adversarial
point clouds between different point cloud networks, to-
gether with that between point clouds and grids (CNNs).
Our findings could benefit the deep network design for point
cloud in terms of representation, robustness and reliability.
Our code for reproducing the attack and defense results will
be soon available.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Deep Learning on Point Clouds
Point clouds are widely involved in modern 3D vision
research. Shape classification on ModelNet40 dataset [33]
is one of important tasks that benchmark this area. Voxel-
based methods [26, 24], which classify pre-rendered point
clouds with 2D / 3D CNNs, require computation-intensive
rendering and (regular or sparse) convolution operation,
hindering the real-time application in practice.
Alternatively, learning directly on point sets provides
several advantages on speed and accuracy, with the require-
ments of 1) permutation-invariance and 2) ability to pro-
cess size-varying data. PointNets [23] and DeepSets [36]
pioneer this direction, and it has become a mainstream
on reasoning about point clouds. To make the networks
able to consume point sets, they use a stack of symmetric
functions based on (max-)pooling to build the neural net-
works. PointNet++ [25] extends PointNet by introducing
hierarchical structure with spatial nearest-neighbor graphs,
and achieves better classification performance. Subsequent
methods [17, 14] improve the core operations in the hier-
archical structure, and DGCNN [32] introduces a dynamic
way to build spatial-neighbor graphs. We refer these net-
works as Point Cloud Networks (PC-Nets) for simplicity.
The core operator f : RN×c → Rc of PointNets is as
follows:
f(X) = γ max
xi∈X
{h(xi)}, (1)
where X ∈ RN×c denotes a point set, xi ∈ Rc denotes a
single point (a row) in X , γ and h are two learnable neural
networks. It is proven that this simple function is able to
approximate any continuous set function [23] defined under
Hausdorff distance,
DH(S, S′) = max
s′∈S′
min
s∈S
l2(s, s
′). (2)
Moreover, for a K-dimension max-pooling based aggre-
gation, it is also proven that there exists NC points in the
input points (NC ≤ K) responsible for the final output,
i.e., the output does not change by removing any remaining
points. For this reason, the NC points are called the critical
points. The authors declare robustness on ”small corrup-
tions or extra noise points” [23] thanks to the property of
critical points. On the contrary, we argue that the PointNets
are vulnerable in adversarial setting; besides, attack on the
critical points is much successful.
2.2. Adversarial Samples and Adversarial Attack
Adversarial sample was first formalized by Szegedy et
al. [28]. Conceptually, an adversarial sample Xa is gener-
ated by deliberately perturbing a natural sample X , which
misleads model f to output incorrectly. We focus on untar-
geted attack in this study; In other words, for some distance
metric D and constrain  ∈ R,
f(Xa) 6= f(X), s.t.D(Xa, X) < . (3)
Generating adversarial samples is called adversarial at-
tack. There has been numerous works focusing on attack
on image classification, such as fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) [8], least-likely-class iterative method [16] and
one-pixel attack [27]. Neural networks are proven to be vul-
nerable to the adversarial attacks, especially in a white-box
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setting, where the adversary has full access, including hid-
den layers and gradients, to the models.
We explore white-box adversarial attacks on point
clouds. The main difference is that images are fixed-
dimension grids, while point clouds are represented as sets.
A set is orderless and unstructured, thus distance between
sets can be very differently defined from that of grids. In our
experiments, asymmetric Chamfer pseudo-distance (DC)
[1] is used as a main measurement,
DC(S, S′) = 1||S′||
∑
s′∈S′
min
s∈S
l2(s, s
′), (4)
where ||·|| denotes points number in a set. Note the Chamfer
distance (Eq. 4) is not so strict as Hausdorff distance (Eq.
2): the latter is less tolerant of outliers in the target set S′.
In practice, outlier noises are very common in 3D sensing,
that is the reason why we choose Chamfer distance.
However, neither the Hausdorff distance nor the Chamfer
distance measures the number of points changed. Thereby,
apart from modifying natural samples point-wisely, it is fea-
sible to perturb point sets by attaching or detaching some
points, which is generally impossible for images. For this
case, we define the number change measurement,
∆NS,S′ = abs(||S|| − ||S′||). (5)
2.3. Defense to Adversarial Attack
Several prior works develop defense strategies against
adversarial attacks, these works can be regarded as either of
two directions: 1) Improve the ability of attacked models to
classify adversarial samples correctly. For instance, adver-
sarial training, i.e., attaching training data with adversarial
samples [8, 21]; or using an additional network to ”denoise”
adversarial samples [9]. 2) Detect adversarial samples and
reject them, e.g., LID [19] suggests a characteristic to detect
adversarial samples 2.
In this paper, we mainly focus on attack and defense on
PC-Nets, on the ModelNet40 and MNIST dataset. Only
white-box, untargeted attacks are addressed. Our defense
strategy follows the ”detect-and-refuse” approaches. We
note there is a parallel study [34] working on the adver-
sarial attack on point sets, while we develop a novel de-
fense framework and more attack methods, e.g., point de-
tachment, as well as discuss the transferability of the adver-
sarial samples.
3. Attack Methods
3.1. Principles and Notations
We represent an input point cloud as X ∈ RN×c, where
N denotes the number of points, and c denotes the dimen-
2Though the authors emphasize that it ”is not intended as a defense” in
personal communication [2].
sion of a single point (c = 3 for the 3D space in our work).
The set of all point clouds in the dataset is defined as X.
f(·) is the point cloud network output probability scores of
different classes, and c∗(·) is the true label.
Consequently, the attack problem setting is described as
follows: by changing input data X to Xa = T(X), where
T denotes an attack function, given a certain attack budget
 under distance metric D, the goal is to decrease classifica-
tion accuracy of attacked model. We define B as the set of
adversarial samples under budget ,
B : {Xa‖ f(X) = f∗(X) and f(Xa) 6= f∗(Xa)}. (6)
The attack performance is evaluated by post-attack
model accuracy,
η =
||{T (X) | arg max f(T (X)) = c∗(X)}||
||X|| . (7)
3.2. Pointwise Gradient Method
Inspired by the success of gradient-guided attack meth-
ods (e.g., FGSM [8]) on natural images, we first generate
the adversarial point clouds by pointwise gradient guided
perturbation. Given attack budget  under the Chamfer dis-
tance (Eq. 4), an adversarial sample is obtained by
Xa = TPG(X), s.t.DC(Xa, X) < , (8)
where TPG(x) is an iterative perturbation based on point-
wise gradient descent. To decrease the model maximum
output in the untargeted-attack setting, we obtain its gradi-
ent on the input, via backward pass of output of the ground
truth class,
∇Xa = ∂f
(t)(Xa)
∂Xa
, t = c∗(X). (9)
For FGSM, an adversarial sample is obtained by:
Xn+1 = Xn − αsign∇Xa, (10)
where function sign(x) = 1(x ≥ 0) − 1(x < 0) ensures
that the magnitude of the single-step change is maximized
with the -restriction under certain distance D.
In our experiments, we use a different iteration formula
based on l2-normalized gradients [20],
Xn+1 = Xn − α ∇Xa
l2(∇Xa) , (11)
which leads to better attack performance and a more stable
convergence. The following proposition declares a theo-
retical guarantee for universal feasibility of the Pointwise
Gradient Method.
Proposition 1. Given any point cloud dataset X, ∃ ∈ R,
∀X ∈ X s.t. arg max f(X) = c∗(X), ∃Xa = TPG(X) :
DC(X,Xa) <  and arg max f(Xa) 6= c∗(X).
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3.3. Point-Detach Method
Pointwise Gradient Method adds perturbation to every
point, which is hardly possible in practice. We investi-
gate a more realistic scenario by detaching a few points; in
physical world, point vanishing is common in 3D sensing,
due to occlusion and scale issues. Although prior works
[23, 25, 17] declare robustness on various numbers of in-
put points, we consider this scenario in an adversarial set-
ting, which can be regarded as a variant of one-pixel attack
[27] on the point clouds. Since the Chamfer distance does
not measure the points missing from the original set (i.e.,
DC ≡ 0 when detaching points), we define the attack bud-
get as the number change measurement ∆N (Eq. 5), thus
an adversarial point-detach sample is denoted as
Xa = TPD(X) ⊆ X, s.t.∆NX,Xa ≤ Nd, (12)
where TPD defines a point-detach perturbation.
For PointNets [23], we develop a point-detach strategy
ulitizing the critical point property (see Section 2.1). Re-
call that the model output changes if and only if the miss-
ing point is one of the critical points. As the critical points
bounded by the K-dimension max-pooling layer are class-
agnostic, to efficiently achieve the untargeted attack, we de-
fine a class-dependent importance I(i) via Taylor first-order
approximation of point i’s contribution.
Denote HX ∈ RN×K as neural networks features with
input X , before max-pooling aggregation, its gradient ma-
trix w.r.t. the true class output is
∇HX = ∂
∂HX
f (t)(X), t = c∗(X). (13)
Note that ∇HX ∈ RN×K is a sparse matrix with non-zero
only at the critical points, i.e.,
∇H(i,j)X 6= 0, iff i = arg max
k
H
(k,j)
X for j = 1, ..,K.
(14)
To count the value change ∆ of channel i if its critical
point is detached, we introduce a substitute vectorG ∈ RK ,
whereG(j) is the second largest value the channel j (the jth
column of H), then
∆(j) = max
i
H(i,j) −G(j), (15)
thereby, using a first-order Taylor approximation, the class-
dependent importance of point i is,
I(i) =
K∑
j
∇H(i,j)X ·∆(j). (16)
To confuse the attacked network, we apply a greedy
strategy, to iteratively detach the most important point de-
pendent on the true class, until we have detachedNd points.
Note that in every iteration, the importance order of the re-
maining points may change. For this reason, we re-compute
the class-dependent importance for each remaining point for
every iteration, which makes our point-detach method an
O(N ·Nd) algorithm.
3.4. Point-Attach Method
Similarly, by attaching a few points at appropriate posi-
tions, we expect another variant of one-pixel attack on point
clouds,
Xa = TPA(X) ⊇ X. (17)
where TPD is attaching some points to the original point
cloud data with the restriction:
∆NX,Xa ≤ Na, DC(Xa, X) < . (18)
Define Xa = X ∪ X ′a, where X ′a is the attached points,
thereby DC(X ′a, X) = DC(Xa, X), and ||X ′a|| ≤ Na. We
initialize X ′a randomly, following Eq. 9, we replace ∇X
by,
∇X ′a =
∂[f (t)(Xa) + λ ∗ Dc(X,X ′a)]
∂X ′a
. (19)
Where λ ∗ Dc(X,X ′a) is an Lagrange multipier to restrict
the attached points to move around surface of point cloud
objects. In our experiments λ = 0.001 empirically. We use
Eq. 11 to only update the attached points without changing
the original point cloud. This iteration is repeated until ex-
ceeding the adversarial budgets. The proposition below fur-
ther provides a theoretical guarantee for our Point-Attach
Method given any point cloud datasets:
Proposition 2. Given any point cloud dataset X, ∃ ∈
R, ∃Na ∈ N, ∀X ∈ X s.t. arg max f(X) = c∗(X),
∃Xa = TPA(X) : DC(X,Xa) < , ∆NX,Xa ≤ Na, and
arg max f(Xa) 6= c∗(X).
4. Defense Methods
4.1. Principle and Notation
Given a test sample X ∈ RN×c, unknown whether it is
an adversarial sample X ∈ B or a natural sample X ∈ X,
our defense methods are supposed to detect X ∈ B and
reject them.
Observed that the outputs of adversarial point clouds are
less stable than the natural ones facing small perturbation,
we assume the adversarial samples exist in a narrow and
very structured sub-space in a high-dimension input space;
in other words, by perturbing inputs nondirectionally, we
expect the attack to be less aggressive with help of the in-
trinsic robustness of the attacked models.
To this regard, we propose several perturbation methods,
which are related to input transformation [10] and stochas-
tic activation [6] methodology on natural images. However,
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for small perturbation, the predictive class does not change
in most cases; besides, a perturbation-only defense may be
not safe enough since the ”obfuscated gradients give a false
sense of security” [2]. Instead of utilizing the perturbation
as a direct defense, we argue that statistics of the outputs
provide rich information to detect the adversarial samples.
Our defense framework follows a perturbation-
measurement principle, which applies perturbation
methods P(·) on X multiple times before measuring
particular statistics of outputs, and detects the adversarial
samples by thresholding the statistics. We define an
M -times pertubation input set of X as,
X ′m = {X ′1, X ′2...X ′i...X ′M |X ′i = Pi(X)}. (20)
then an M -times perturbation output set is defined as,
O′m = {O′1, O′2...O′i...O′M |O′i = f(X ′i)}, (21)
where f denotes a PC-Net (PointNet [23] in our experi-
ments). As will be shown later, the distributions of O′m are
very different between natural samples and adversarial sam-
ples. We compute certain statistics over O′m, to capture the
difference, and report several metrics as [18] to evaluate the
adversarial sample detection performance.
• AUROC is the Area Under the Receiver Operating
Characteristic curve [7], a.k.a. AUC, which serves as
an evaluation method widely used in binary classifica-
tion. Note AUROC is threshold-free and insensitive to
class imbalance. In our setting, AUROC measures the
separability of the adversarial samples and the natural
samples. As we use imperfect PC-Nets in the defense,
we consider two situations for fair evaluation: 1) All:
the AUROC between adversarial samples and all nat-
ural samples in the test set, and 2) Correct: the AU-
ROC between adversarial samples and only the cor-
rectly classified natural samples in the test set.
• Defense Detection Rate (DDR) (@ t%), measures the
detection sensitivity at a threshold where the speci-
ficity is 1−t%, appearing as a single point on the ROC
curve. In other words, it measures how many adversar-
ial samples are detected when t% of natural samples
is incorrectly rejected. Note we define the adversarial
samples as the positive class.
In the following sections, we instantiate the framework
into several perturbations and measurements, to adapt to
different attack scenarios.
4.2. Perturbation Methods
Gaussian Noising. As common practices [30, 9] for ro-
bustness test in machine learning, we first add Gaussian
noises ρ to X , named Gaussian Noising Method Gσi (·).
Pi(X) = Gσi (X) , X + ρi, s.t. ρi ∼ {N(0, σ2)}N×c.
(22)
The noises are i.i.d. sampled from a Gaussian distribution
N(0, σ2). Adding undirectional Gaussian noise to X helps
the attacked models to escape from the narrow adversarial
sub-space, which enables an effective follow-up detection.
Quantification. Motivated by the fact that adversarial
perturbations are by definition small in magnitude, we de-
fine a Quantification Method Qµi (·) to convert the inputs
into low numerical precision with multiple quantification
levels,
Pi(X) = Qµi (X) , bX ×
M
µ× ic × (
µ× i
M
), (23)
where µ defines as a max quantification level. For i =
1, ...,M , quantification level ranges from µ/M to µ. With
larger quantification level, X ′ appears more distorting. PC-
Nets are robust to natural samples with a degree of distor-
tion, while we observe that adversarial samples are vulner-
able to quantification, resulting in chaotic distributions of
outputs from the classifier and distinguishable statistics.
Random Sampling. The above perturbations are defined
on the Euclidean space, we then define a perturbation on the
number of points changed ∆N . For X contains N points,
we randomly sample n (n < N ) points si from X without
replacement, named Random Sampling Method Sni (X).
Pi(X) = Sni (X) = {1xx |x ∈ X, 1x ∼ Ber(0.5)},
(24)
where 1x is sampled from Bernoulli(0.5) distribution to
indicate the existence of point x in the post-sampled set. As
expected, the sampling perturbation is very effective against
the point-attach attacks (Section 5.2).
4.3. Measurement Methods
Given a perturbation output set O′m, for each O
′
i ∈ O′m,
O′i = {o′i1, o′i2...o′ij ...o′iNc}, s.t. o′ij ∈ [0, 1], (25)
where o′ij denotes the confidence score of class j, and Nc is
the number of output classes.
Set-Indiv Variance Measurement. As observed that the
adversarial samples destabilize the model outputs, we first
consider to measure the diversity of confidences on the
output classes, instead of using an entropy-based measure-
ment, we find variance is more distinguishable in practice,
thereby a Set-Indiv Variance Measurement SIV(·) is defined
as
SIV(O′m) =
1
Nc
Nc∑
k=1
Vari∈1,2,...M (o′ik). (26)
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The variance of each class’s confidence set is computed
before averaged to SIV measurement, which is empirically
the most effective in most cases (Section 5.2).
Max Confidence-Based Measurement. Inspired by prior
works on out-of-distribution detection [11, 18], we propose
to use the max confidence score to detect adversarial sam-
ples. In our perturbation-measurement framework, we use
the max confidence scores statistically.
We define a Confidence Average Measurement CoA(·),
CoA(O′m) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
( max
j∈1,2,...Nc
(o′ij)), (27)
which measures the average of max confidence scores.
Besides, we also measure the variance of max confi-
dence scores, by designing Confidence Variance Measure-
ment CoV(·),
CoV(O′m) = Vari∈1,2...M ( max
j∈1,2...Nc
(o′ij)). (28)
With the following two assumptions, we provide a theo-
retical guarantee for the effectiveness of Max Confidence-
based Measurement.
Assumption 1. PC-Nets are local continuous convex or
concave functions around natural samples.
Assumption 2. The proportion of adversarial samples in
the local area around natural samples is small enough, i.e.,
given natural sample Xn,
∃δ > 0, defineDδ = {X | DC(X,Xn) < δ},
Bδ = {Xa is adversarial sample | DC(Xa, Xn) < δ} ⊂ D,
∃ 1 : ∀X,P (X ∈ Bδ)/P (X ∈ Dδ) < .
Proposition 1. Given any sample X , it can always be de-
tected whether it is an adversarial sample or a natural sam-
ple by Max Confidence-Based Measurement (Section 4.3)
(CoV for Convex functions and CoA for Concave func-
tions), with Gaussian Noising or Quantification perturba-
tion (Section 4.2).
5. Results
In this section, we evaluate the attack performances of
our methods on a simple yet effective PC-Net, PointNet
(with T-Net) [23]. At the same time, we conduct defense
experiments on these adversarial point clouds with positive
results. All results are reported on ModelNet40 dataset [33]
of 40-category CAD models if not specified otherwise. We
use the official split with 9,843 samples for training, and
2,468 samples for test / attack / defense. 1,024 points are
uniformly sampled from the mesh surfaces as in PointNet.
Figure 2. Natural point clouds and adversarial point clouds
produced by three attack methods. Pointwise Gradient method
point clouds are generated in Dc = 0.02. The 40 red points in
Point-Detach method are points that have been detached. The 32
green points in Point-Attach method are attached points.
Pointwise Gradient Method
DC 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
η 86.58 59.21 39.38 29.25 9.25 0.00
Point-Detach Method
Nd 8 12 16 20 30 40
η 87.54 86.53 85.21 83.89 81.21 78.89
Point-Attach Method
Na 16 16 16 32 32 32
Dc 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5
η 86.82 85.14 84.89 84.26 83.89 83.17
Table 1. Attack performance on ModelNet40 dataset with three
different methods. Metric (η) is the accuracy (%) on classifica-
tion after attacking.
5.1. Attack Performance
In order to verify the performance of our attack method,
extensive experiments are conducted. The attack perfor-
mance is shown in Table 1. Different attack parameters
6
Attack Method Param. Perturb. Measur. AUCAll AUCCorrect DDR (@5%) DDR (@10%)
Pointwise Gradient DC = 0.02 Quanti. (0.08) SIV 0.9168 0.9381 61.34 80.78
Point-Detach Nd = 20 GN. (0.012) SIV 0.9229 0.9517 65.69 88.73
Point-Detach Nd = 40 GN. (0.012) SIV 0.9011 0.9343 54.26 77.56
Point-Attach Na = 32 RS. (1000) SIV 0.9729 0.9816 93.15 95.21
Table 2. Defense performance with best perturbation-measurement combination toward three attack methods. The defense strategies
detect most (> 75%) adversarial samples. The Defense Detection Rates (DDR) are evaluated with Correct natural samples.
correspond to different attack intensities. By applying our
Pointwise Gradient method, the accuracy of PointNet could
be reduced to 0%, which means that all natural samples are
attacked. Although Point-Detach method does not achieve
comparable performance in terms of accuracy reduction, the
adversarial samples generated by this method are generally
unnoticeable and can easily deceive human’s eyes. In Point-
Attach method, we utilize different parameters. Better per-
formance is achieved with more attached points and larger
Chamfer distance.
Figure 2 shows the contrast between natural samples
and adversarial samples, which is visually indiscernible. In
Point-Detach method, the detached points are the critical
points, which are often located on the edges of the point
clouds.
5.2. Defense Performance
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Figure 3. Left: Kernel density estimation (KDE) of −log(SIV )
towards 32-point Point-Attach method, which shows statistics dis-
tribution of adversarial samples and Correct natural samples.
Right: KDE contrast between adversarial samples, All natural
samples, and Correct natural samples, which reveals the Defense
Error II in Section 7.
Perturbation-measurement defense methods are utilized
to detect the adversarial samples produced by three attack
methods. AUROC and Defense Detection Rate (DDR) re-
flect the defense performance of different methods, which
are shown in Table 2. Given the fact that our defense meth-
ods strongly rely on the robustness of PC-Nets, their per-
formance drops with Nd increasing in the defense of Point-
Detach attack. When the critical points detached, the fluctu-
ation of outputs decreases, resulting in a decrease of DDR.
The statistics CoA and CoV perform slightly worse than
SIV , their performance is shown in Appendix D.
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
PointNet 89.20 86.58 59.21 39.38 29.25 9.25
PointNet++ 90.43 80.50 52.55 10.43 1.05 0.00
DGCNN 91.51 87.48 82.40 75.52 63.63 49.59
Table 3. The accuracy (%) of different PC-Nets and DC . It shows
the robustness of PC-Nets, in which DGCNN performs the best
robustness among the three PC-Nets.
Two kinds of natural samples are evaluated: All natural
samples which belong to the whole test dataset andCorrect
natural samples which are point clouds that can be correctly
classified by PC-Nets. We will give a further discussion in
Section 7 about these two natural samples.
The kernel density estimation (KDE) of −log(SIV ) is
shown in Figure 3, which reflects the distribution of mea-
sured statistics. We apply −log(·) operation for visual
convenience. The adversarial samples can be detected by
choosing different thresholds.
6. Transferability of Adversarial Samples
6.1. Between Various PC-Nets
Some other PC-Nets such as PointNet++ by Qi [25] and
Dynamic Graph CNN by Wang [32] are designed based
on PointNet [23]. We evaluate the attack performance and
transferability of these PC-Nets.
Attack Performance. Pointwise Gradient method is uni-
versal to attack PC-Nets. Thus, we apply it to evaluate the
robustness of them. The accuracy of PC-Nets after attack-
ing is shown in Table 3, which reflect their robustness.
We observe that DGCNN has better robustness than that
of PointNet and PointNet++. Since Pointwise Gradient
method is directional, the dynamic edge convolution oper-
ation in DGCNN disturbs the attacking direction and con-
tributes to high robustness.
The accuracy of PointNet++ decreases with attack inten-
sity increasing, concluding that PointNet++ model appears
worse robustness than PointNet and DGCNN.
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PointNet PointNet++ DGCNN
PointNet 100.0 / 0.00 94.63 / 94.21 88.57 / 87.01
PointNet++ 89.79 / 83.01 100.0 / 0.00 84.42 / 81.56
DGCNN 92.63 / 87.53 95.89 / 94.63 100.0 / 0.00
Table 4. Adversarial samples transferability evaluation of different
PC-Nets. The nets in the left column generate adversarial sample
and the nets in the first row evaluate the transferred adversarial
samples. The first number is accuracy (%) of the samples before
attacking and the second number is transferred accuracy (%).
Transferability. To evaluate transferability between these
PC-Nets, we transfer adversarial samples generated by one
net with Pointwise Gradient method to another evaluating
PC-Net. The evaluation results are shown in Table 4, in
which the transferred accuracy means the test accuracy of
generated adversarial samples on evaluating PC-Net.
The evaluation results indicate that the attack transfer-
ability of different PC-Nets is poor, which means that Point-
wise Gradient method is not suited for black-box adversar-
ial attack in PC-Nets cases.
6.2. Between PC-Nets and CNNs
To fully investigate the transferability of adversarial sam-
ples generated by our methods, we explore the transfer ro-
bustness between PC-Nets and CNNs on MNIST dataset.
Data conversion details between point clouds and MNIST
images are provided in Appendix B.
Transferring from PC-Nets to CNNs. We apply Point-
wise Gradient method to attack PC-Net (PointNet) which
classifies MNIST. The attack performance η is 21%. Af-
ter converting the adversarial point clouds to images and
transfering them to MNIST CNN model, the accuracy of
the CNN model drops from 99.1% to 60.8%. The left part
in Figure 4 shows samples generated by PC-Nets.
Transferring from CNNs to PC-Nets. Different attack
thresholds  are set on the MNIST CNN model. We use
PointNet model to classify these samples, which shows no-
table robustness: PointNet still reaches 98.9% accuracy in
the worst case. The attack and transferring performance is
shown in the right part of Figure 4.
7. Discussion
Robustness on Rotation We find that rotation does not
produce adversarial samples to PointNet effectively, since
the PointNet is sensitive to rotation. Note that rotation data
augmentation has been applied during training the PointNet
with T-Net [23] mimicking spatial transformers [12].
In our experiment, rotation angles in x-axis and y-axis
are limited within 0.3 rad. We attempt to attack PointNet
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Figure 4. Left: The converted 2D images from MNIST samples at-
tacked by PC-Nets. Right: Transferring performance from CNN
models to PC-Nets. Attack CNN models on MNIST dataset to ob-
tain some adversarial samples and use PC-Nets to classify these
samples. The result indicates that PC-Nets is robust to the adver-
sarial samples transferred from CNN models.
using a gradient-based approach on the rotation matrix, see
Appendix C for the details of rotation attack. The attack
method drops the classification accuracy from 89.2% to
76.01%. However, randomly rotating natural point clouds
within a same degree drops the accuracy to 77.53%, with
NO significant difference. The reason for which we ar-
gue is that the weak robustness on rotation provides non-
informative gradients (”stochastic gradients”) to the gradi-
ent based attack. For AI safety, PC-Nets should also be
designed with theoritically guaranteed rotation-invariance
[3, 4]. We leave this for further exploration.
Two Types of Defense Errors. We characterize two types
of defense errors with perturbation-measurement frame-
work. Defense Error I is the error caused by the de-
fense framework. As illustrated in Figure 3 Left, there
are overlaps between the distributions of adversarial sam-
ples and natural samples. To reduce the Defense Error I,
advanced perturbations and measurements with fine-tuned
hyper-parameters should be explored.
As we explore the intrinsic robustness of the attack
model, we suffer from its weakness by design, resulting in
Defense Error II. Refer to Figure 3 Right, the distribution
of Correct and All natural samples is sightly different. We
observe that the defense performance with Correct natural
samples better than that with All natural samples, which
means the misclassified natural samples by PC-Nets are
more likely to be mistakenly regarded as adversarial sam-
ples. We can choose Correct samples in defense methods
to less count the Defense Error II. Theoretically, a better-
performing model comes with lower Defense Error II.
Limitations and Further Work. Although we have con-
ducted experiments on transferability, all these three meth-
ods are based on white-box attack. It is a further work for
black-box PC-Nets adversarial attacks and defenses.
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We only apply our Point-Detach attack method on Point-
Net model due to the utilization of critical points in Point-
Net whom many other PC-Nets share the same structure
with, it can be further explored on Point-Detach attack
method on other PC-Nets.
Since our methods utilize the PC-Nets’ own robustness
to detect adversarial samples, our defense to the Point-
Detach attack methods does not perform well with largeNd.
The robustness of PC-Nets decreases as the critical points
detached, which affects our measured statistics and worsen
the defense performance.
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Appendix
A. Proofs
A.1. On Pointwise-Gradient Attack
Proposition 1. Given any point cloud datasetX, ∃ ∈ R, ∀X ∈ X
s.t. arg max f(X) = c∗(X), ∃Xa = TPG(X) : DC(X,Xa) <
 and arg max f(Xa) 6= c∗(X).
Proof. Ultimately, for any sample X with label t, we could point-
wisely change it into another sample X ′ with label t′.
In this way, X = DC(X,X ′). For all samples in the dataset,
 = maxX∈X(X).
A.2. On Point-Attach Attack
Proposition 2. Given any point cloud dataset X, ∃ ∈ R, ∃Na ∈
N, ∃X ∈ X s.t. arg max f(X) = c∗(X), ∃Xa = TPA(X) :
DC(X,Xa) < , ∆NX,Xa ≤ Na, and arg max f(Xa) 6=
c∗(X).
Proof. By contradiction.
Assume there is not such sample in the dataset. We choose two
samples X1 and X2 with different labels, then attach one to an-
other as a new sampleX ′. If the prediction label is the same as the
X1, then we successfully attack X2 by attaching X1. Otherwise,
we successfully attack X1 by attaching X2.
A.3. On Max Confidence-Based Measurement
Assumption 1. PC-Nets are local continuous convex or concave
functions around natural samples.
Assumption 2. The proportion of adversarial samples in the local
area around natural samples is small enough, i.e., given natural
sample Xn,
∃δ > 0, defineDδ = {X | DC(X,Xn) < δ},
Bδ = {Xa is adversarial sample | DC(Xa, Xn) < δ} ⊂ D,
∃ 1 : ∀X,P (X ∈ Bδ)/P (X ∈ Dδ) < .
Proposition 3. Given any sample X , it can always be detected
whether it is an adversarial sample or a natural sample by Max
Confidence-Based Measurement (Section 4.3) (CoV for Convex
functions andCoA for Concave functions), with Gaussian Noising
or Quantification perturbation (Section 4.2).
Proof. We prove this proposition in two separate propositions
(Proposition 4 and Proposition 5).
Proposition 4 (Concave). CoA is an effective index to detect
whether an given sample X is an adversarial sample or a natu-
ral sample if PC-Nets are local continuous concave functions.
Proof. Without losing generality, we choose a dataset containing
with only 2 labels: negative and positive, the network output value
is limited between 0 and 1. Specifically, if it is more than 0.5, it
denotes positive class, otherwise, it denotes negative class. Similar
to Gaussian Noising, Quantization is equavalent to add perturba-
tion using uniform distribution. For simplicity, we take uniform
distribution as example.
Assume x1 is the quantized data for a negative adversarial sam-
ple Xa and x2 is the quantized data of the corresponding posi-
tive natural sample X . Besides, we apply a same perturbation to
x1 and x2, DC(x1, Xa) ∈ [a1, b1], DC(x2, X) ∈ [a2, b2], note
b1− a1 = b2− a2 (for the ”same perturbation”). Thus, according
to the definition of CoA, we have:
CoA(x1) =
1
b1 − a1
∫ b1
a1
[1− f(x)]dx,
CoA(x2) =
1
b2 − a2
∫ b2
a2
f(x)dx.
Define f is the PC-Net, f ′ is its derivative. Since f is continu-
ous, ∃c : f(c) = 0.5 when the point set varies from x2(f(x2) >
0.5) to x1(f(x1) < 0.5). Besides, since f is a concave function
via the distance, we have the following equations:
f(x1) > 0.5− |f ′(c)| ∗ DC(x1, c),
f(x2) > 0.5 + |f ′(c)| ∗ DC(c, x2).
𝑎2 𝑏2 𝑎1 𝑏1
𝑓(𝑥)
𝑥2 𝑥1
𝑎2 𝑏2 𝑎1 𝑏1
𝑓(𝑥)
𝑥2 𝑥1
ConcaveConvex
𝑐 𝑐
0.5
1
0.5
1
𝑔2 (𝑥)
𝑔1 (𝑥)
Figure 5. Illustration for Proposition 4. The tangent at f(c) = 0.5
is shown in the figure.
According to our assumption, adversarial samples are much
less than natural samples, as illustrated in Figure 5:
DC(c, x2) > DC(x1, c).
Thereby,
f(x2) > 1− f(x1)
⇒ 1
b2 − a2
∫ b2
a2
f(x)dx >
1
b1 − a1
∫ b1
a1
[1− f(x)]dx,
which means CoA(x2) > CoA(x1), thus CoA is effective to
detect adversarial samples.
To prove the next proposition, we provide following lemma:
Lemma. ∀x, ∀f(x), ∀c: ∫ b
a
[f(x) − 1
b−a
∫ b
a
f(x)dx]2dx 6∫ b
a
(f(x)− c)2dx
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Proof.
∫ b
a
[f(x)− 1
b− a
∫ b
a
f(x)dx]2dx
=
∫ b
a
(f(x)− c)2dx+ 2(c− 1
b− a
∫ b
a
f(x)dx)×∫ b
a
(f(x)− c)dx+ (c− 1
b− a
∫ b
a
f(x)dx)2(b− a)
=
∫ b
a
(f(x)− c)2dx+ 2
a− b [
∫ b
a
(f(x)− c)dx]2
+
1
b− a [
∫ b
a
(f(x)− c)dx]2
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∫ b
a
(f(x)− c)2dx
Proposition 5 (Convex). CoV is an effective index to detect
whether an given sample X is an adversarial sample or a natu-
ral sample if PC-Nets are local continuous convex functions.
𝑎2 𝑏2 𝑎1 𝑏1
𝑓(𝑥)
𝑥2 𝑥1
𝑎2 𝑏2 𝑎1 𝑏1
𝑓(𝑥)
𝑥2 𝑥1
ConcaveConvex
𝑐 1
𝑐
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1
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𝑐 2
Figure 6. Illustration for the Proposition 5. The two straight lines
are parameterized by g1(x) = f ′(a1)x+ l1, s.t. g1(c1) = f(c1),
g2(x) = f
′(b2)x+ l2, s.t. f(c2) = g(c2).
Proof. We use the same notations in the Proposition 5.
For adversarial sample: according to mean value theorem of in-
tegrals, ∃c1, f(c1) = 1b1−a1
∫ b1
a1
f(x)dx, we construct: g1(x) =
f ′(a1)x+ l1, s.t.g1(c1) = f(c1).
CoV (x1) =
∫ b1
a1
[f(x)− f(c1)]2dx
>
∫ b1
a1
[g(x)− f(c1)]2dx (illustrated in Figure 6)
=
∫ b1
a1
[g(x)− g(c1)]2dx
≥
∫ b1
a1
[g(x)− 1
b1 − a1
∫ b1
a1
g(x)dx]2dx (Lemma)
=
∫ b1
a1
[f ′(a1)x− f
′(a1)(a1 + b1)
2
]2dx
=
1
12
f ′(a1)
2(b1 − a1)3
For natural sample: according to our assumption that f(x) is con-
tinuous, we can choose c2 satisfying DC(c2, x2) = a2+b22 and
construct g2(x) = f ′(b2)x+ l2, s.t.f(c2) = g(c2).
CoV (x2) =
∫ b2
a2
[f(x)− 1
b2 − a2
∫ b2
b2
f(x)dx]2dx
≤
∫ b2
a2
[f(x)− f(c2)]2dx (Lemma)
<
∫ b2
a2
[g2(x)− f(c2)]2dx (illustrated in Figure 6)
=
∫ b2
a2
[g2(x)− g(c2)]2dx
=
∫ b2
a2
[f ′(b2)x− f
′(b2)(a2 + b2)
2
]2dx
=
1
12
f ′(b2)
2(b2 − a2)3
Since a1 > b2 and f(x) is a convex function, f ′(a1)2 >
f ′(b2)2. Besides, we have b2 − a2 = b1 − a1, which means
CoV (x1) > CoV (x2). Thereby, CoV is effective to detect ad-
versarial samples and natural samples.
B. Conversion between MNIST Images and
Point Clouds
From images to point clouds, we convert each pixel position to
x, y axis and grayscale value to z axis in point cloud {(x, y, z)}.
From (attacked) point clouds to images, we firstly abandon the
points whose x, y axis is less than 0 or more than 1, which are out
of border; then, we convert x, y axis to the corresponding pixel
position in image with 1
28
quantification, and z axis to pixel value.
If several points are converted to a overlapping pixel position in
image, we adapt their average z values. For the pixels without
corresponding point, we set their values as zero.
C. Details of Rotation Attack
In Section 7, we evaluate robustness of PointNet [23] on rota-
tion. We use Euler angles (Figure 7) to parameterize rotation.
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AUROC Random Sampling Quantification Gaussian NoisingSIV CoA CoV SIV CoA CoV SIV CoA CoV
Pointwise Gradient n = 500 µ = 0.08 σ = 0.020
DC = 0.02 All 0.8806 0.8544 0.8749 0.9168 0.8639 0.9086 0.8839 0.8589 0.8816Correct 0.9132 0.9006 0.9054 0.9381 0.9125 0.9323 0.9207 0.9040 0.9192
n = 500 µ = 0.12 σ = 0.028
DC = 0.05 All 0.8092 0.74283 0.80705 0.8352 0.75224 0.82039 0.78812 0.74675 0.78686Correct 0.84692 0.79698 0.84286 0.85932 0.80872 0.84934 0.82665 0.79681 0.82403
Point-Detach n = 950 µ = 0.02 σ = 0.012
Nd = 20
All 0.9053 0.9083 0.9016 0.9154 0.9109 0.9097 0.9229 0.9139 0.9152
Correct 0.9393 0.9439 0.9357 0.9454 0.9455 0.9407 0.9517 0.9475 0.9453
Nd = 40
All 0.8705 0.8770 0.8681 0.8901 0.8827 0.8863 0.9011 0.8903 0.8969
Correct 0.9130 0.9190 0.9102 0.9249 0.9231 0.9216 0.9343 0.9282 0.9304
Point-Attach n = 1000 µ = 0.02 σ = 0.012
Na = 16
All 0.9632 0.8275 0.9588 0.8058 0.8084 0.8031 0.8169 0.8113 0.8159
Correct 0.9750 0.8712 0.9720 0.84656 0.8509 0.8442 0.8578 0.8539 0.8565
Na = 32
All 0.9729 0.8507 0.9686 0.8366 0.8329 0.8365 0.8516 0.8379 0.8512
Correct 0.9816 0.8934 0.9785 0.8752 0.8752 0.8746 0.8890 0.8800 0.8878
Table 5. Defense AUROC by using various perturbation-measurement combinations against adversarial samples produced by three
attacking methods (Pointwise Gradient, Point-Detach and Point-Attach).
Mα =
 cosα sinα 0− sinα cosα 0
0 0 1

Mβ =
 1 0 00 cosβ sinβ
0 − sinβ cosβ

Mγ =
 cos γ sin γ 0− sin γ cos γ 0
0 0 1

Xa = X Mγ Mβ Mα
∇θ = ∂f
(t)(Xa)
∂θ
, θ = (α, β, γ)
Following a gradient-based iteration, we update the θ adversari-
ally. Each dimension of θ (i.e., α, β, and γ) is limited in 0.3 rad.
D. More Defense Results
More defense results are showed in Table 5. It provides defense
AUROC with all nine Perturbation-Measurement combinations.
E. Visualization on Pointwise-Gradient Attack
To illustrate the distortion of point cloud under Pointwise Gra-
dient attack with different intensities, we visualize several point
cloud samples in different attack levels. It is observed that certain
point cloud samples become visibly distorted with the Chamfer
distance larger than 0.02.
x
y
z𝛼
𝛽
𝛾
y'
z'
x
y
z
𝛼
y'
z'
x'
Figure 7. Rotation system using Euler angles α, β, and γ. The
rotation axes are x-axis (left), y′-axis (right) and x′-axis (right).
The three angles are limited in 0.3 rad.
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Figure 8. Natural samples and Pointwise Gradient attacked samples with Chamfer distance varies from 0.01 to 0.05. Certain samples
become visibly distorted with the Chamfer distance larger than 0.02.
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